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Abstract
Despite its long tradition and well known contributions, corporate strategy research
is yet far from being mature. This paper proposes an innovative framework that approaches
the field from the theoretical perspective provided by complexity theory. We propose to
see the corporate level of the organization as the driver, pacer and framer of the overall
firm’s evolution process. Drive is provided by the cognitive representation of the corporate
fitness landscape that is implicit in the firm’s corporate plan. Pacing is a consequence of the
kind of strategic initiatives (“search strategy”) developed by the company. Framing is
achieved through the architectural design that the corporate level implements for the firm. 
Keywords: corporate strategy; complexity theory; self-organizingCORPORATE STRATEGY REVISITED:
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1.- Corporate Strategy Research at a Crossroads
After thirty years of abundant research, the field of corporate strategy is not yet
mature. There is still considerable disagreement around some key and long-standing research
questions such as whether diversification can be used to build long-run competitive
advantage and, if so, how and when (Markides and Williamson, 1994). Several studies from
the field of Financial Economics, under the agency cost hypothesis (Morck, Shleifer, Vishny,
1990; Lang and Stulz, 1994; Hoskisson, Johnson, Moesel, 1994; Amihud and Lev, 1981,
1999), found diversification discounts in stock quotations of diversified companies,
concluding that diversification affects performance negatively. However, recent studies that
acknowledge the existence of self-selection in the decision to diversify (Campa and Kedia,
1999; Villalonga, 2000) found that, after controlling for endogeneity of the diversification
decision, those discounts turn to premiums. Moreover, studies performed outside the U.S. in
highly industrialized countries (Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998; Lins and Servaes, 1999) as
well as in emerging markets (Khanna and Palepu, 1997, 2000, 2001; Ghemawat and Khanna,
1998; Guillén, 2000) found that effects of different diversification postures on performance
show mixed results across countries, highlighting the dangers of “exporting” U.S. developed
theories to any country at face value.
Another important stream of research within this field was the one aimed at isolating
and assessing the contribution of company, industry and corporate effects on performance
(Schmalensee, 1985; Rumelt, 1991; Mc Gahan and Porter, 1997). These works aroused a
strong dispute on whether firm or industry effects are the most important, but left clear that
corporate effects appeared to be negligible. However, this “truth” has also been questioned by
recent findings (Brush and Bromiley, 1997; Chang and Singh, 2000; Bowman and Helfat,
2001), leading to the conclusion that studies within this tradition appear to be strongly
affected by apparent and difficult to fix sampling biases and methodological flaws. Biases
depend on factors such as which database was used or the level of aggregation chosen by the
researcher (Chang and Singh, 2000; Bowman and Helfat, 2001) and methodological
criticisms relate to the inappropriateness of variance decomposition as a way to assess
corporate effects on performance (Brush and Bromiley, 1997; Bowman and Helfat, 2001).
As a result of this persistence of mixed results in such important lines of research,
there is increasing agreement around the idea that new approaches to the study of the field
would be welcomed. The creation of corporate advantage may be a phenomenon of a subtlety
not captured by cross-sectional database statistical studies (Bowman and Helfat, 2001).
Bowman (1995) suggested that a better understanding of the design issues in corporate
strategy will open a possible future for the field.This work is an attempt to take a step forward in this direction. In order to approach
the field innovatively we draw on the theoretical tradition of behavioral evolutionism (March
and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982), recently enriched by
the contribution of complexity theory. In particular, we focused on the application of the
work of Kauffman (1993), in the field of biology, to organization theory (Boisot & Child,
1999; Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Levinthal, 1997; Levinthal and Warglien, 1999;
McKelvey 1997, 1999; Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2002). Led by these theoretical lenses, we
developed a framework of corporate strategy in turbulent environments. These environments
are characterized by their high level of dynamism (showing nonlinear positive feedback),
complexity and uncertainty (Crossan, Nanjad and Vera, 2001).
This paper is organized in the following way. First, we will define and discuss
complexity and self-organization and review Kauffman’s (1993) NK(C) framework and its
extensions to management theory. Then, we will introduce a framework of corporate strategy
characterized by three interdependent processes: the development of a cognitive representation
of the fitness landscape; the positioning of the firm in such landscape; and the architectural
design of the firm. Finally, we will discuss how this framework can help to approach empirical
research. 
2.- Complexity and Organizations
Complex systems and the phenomena of complexity have indeed received much
attention from the scientific community recently in disciplines as different as physics, biology
and economy. A complex system is a system (whole) comprised of numerous interacting
entities (parts), each of which is behaving in its local context according to some rule(s) or
force(s). In responding to their own particular local contexts, these individual parts can,
despite acting in parallel without explicit inter-part coordination or communication, cause
the system as a whole to display emergent patterns, orderly phenomena and properties, at the
global or collective level. In some complex systems, the constituent parts are not themselves
complex systems and are governed by unchanging rules. In more complicated complex
systems, these parts can themselves be complex systems, governed by rules that evolve.
These parts are referred to as “adaptive agents”, guided by “internal models”, giving rise to a
whole referred to as a “complex adaptive system” (Holland, 1995, cited in Maguire and
McKelvey, 1998). In these systems, it is possible for a mutually consistent ecology of parts,
along with the internal models and rules guiding them, to emerge or self-organize from what
is effectively a decentralized bottom-up process of codesign. This process is better described
as coadaptation or coevolution, rather than adaptation (Maguire and McKelvey, 1998).
Self-organizing. The idea that order can emerge spontaneously, or that systems may
“self-organize”, is a central one in complexity theory. Self-organizing is a process in which
the components of a system spontaneously communicate with each other and abruptly
cooperate in coordinated and concerted common behavior (Stacey, 1993). Through self-
organization, the behavior of the group emerges from the collective interactions of all the
individuals. Although they may follow “simple rules” of action (Eisenhardt and Sull, 2001),
the resulting group behavior can be surprisingly complex and remarkably effective. 
However, while processes of self-organization are quite powerful, they do not negate
the possibility of design influences. By manipulating the context or organizational landscape,
one may indirectly affect the dynamics of the process. A principal architectural design tool is
the manipulation of interdependencies between the parts of the system. The underlying idea
2is that designing the surface on which adaptation takes place, by manipulating the
interdependencies and by influencing the relationships between individual action and payoffs,
one may affect the quality of the adaptive process without the need to directly specify
individual behavior. Architectural or landscape design conserves the focus on
interdependencies of traditional organizational design theories, but puts the stress on the
manipulation of interdependencies which are not “a given” (Levinthal and Warglien, 1999). 
3.- Fitness landscapes. Kauffman’s NK model
Metaphorically, firms have long been viewed as organisms, gathering resources
from, and adapting to the imperatives of, some environment. More recently, organizational
ecologists have imported models from biology to explain the forces and variables underlying
organizational funding, change and mortality. As a result, the notion of organizational fitness
is well accepted (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). Though typically associated with selectionist
arguments and what is referred to as the environmental school of strategy (Mintzberg,
Ahlstrand and Lampel, 1998), where it is argued that it is the environment that optimized the
design of key organizational features, the notion of “fit” is also found in the design school of
strategy (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel, 1998), which emphasizes strategic choice and
views firms as actively seeking strategic fit. Levinthal (1991) stated that the opposition of
these two arguments is artificial. The exploration of the managerial issues related to
adaptation and strategizing, therefore connecting both approaches, can be done drawing on
Kauffman’s NK model (Kauffman, 1993; Maguire and McKelvey, 1998). 
Kauffman’s contribution. For the twentieth century, biologists have assumed that
“order” was due to the effects of selection, as developed under the general label of Darwinian
selectionist theory (McKelvey, 1999). Kauffman (1993) challenged the unquestioned
universal applicability of selectionist theory by suggesting that in sufficiently complex
systems, selection cannot avoid the order exhibited by organisms as a result of their self-
organizing properties. In such situations, order is present “not because of selection but despite
it” (Kauffman, 1993). For the purpose of explaining the relationship between selection and
self-organizing, he used the fitness landscape metaphor.
Fitness landscapes. Following Levinthal (1997) and McKelvey (1999), we will
accept the premise that Kauffman’s assumptions apply equally well to firms. Organizations
adapt by modifying their existing form in an attempt to enhance their fitness in a payoff
surface or “fitness landscape” (Sewell Wright, 1931, 1932, cited in Levinthal, 1997). A
fitness landscape consists of a multidimensional space in which each attribute of the
organization is represented by a dimension of the space and a final dimension indicates the
fitness level of the organization. In organizational studies, fitness can be represented by profit
or by a mix of variables related to the organization’s goals (Levinthal and Warglien, 1999). 
In the context of population genetics, Kauffman (1993) demonstrates that the
typology of the fitness landscape is determined by the degree of interdependence of the
fitness contribution of the various attributes of an organism. The topography of the fitness
landscape depends upon the degree to which the payoff of a given choice is dependent on
other choices. Increasing the density of interdependencies affects the complexity of the
landscape and, consequently, the emergent patterns of behavior. Levinthal (1997) mentions,
as prominent examples of such interdependence in the management literature, Chandler’s
(1962) work on the relationship of a firm’s strategy and organizational structure and
McKinsey’s 7S framework (Peters and Waterman, 1982), while McKelvey (1999) uses
Porter’s (1985) value chain for a similar purpose. 
3The NK model. Kauffman characterizes fitness landscapes with, essentially, two
structural variables: N, the number of elements that characterize the entity (genes in the
context of Kauffman’s work, actions or policy choices in the context of organizations), and
K, the number of elements of N with which a given attribute interacts. Each attribute can take
on two possible values. Therefore, the fitness landscape consists of 2N possible policy
choices, the overall behavior of the firm being characterized by the vector N{X1, X2,...,XN},
where each Xi takes on the value of 0 or 1. 
Interactions between attributes affect the shape of the landscape. When there are no
interactions between the different attributes, the landscape tends to assume a single-peak
configuration. If the contribution of each actor is independent from that of others, there is an
optimal behavior independent of others’ behavior (Figure 1). In this situation, local
improvement in performance always leads to global improvement, implying a situation of
universal “best practices” (Levinthal and Warglien, 1999). In a single peak (K=0 or similar)
world, local incremental adaptation is a satisfactory solution to the dilemma between
exploiting past experience or exploring alternative bases of action (March, 1991). 
Figure 1. A “smooth” or single-peak fitness landscape
However, as interactions increase, the landscape becomes more rugged or
multipeaked. Multiple peaks are the direct result of interdependences among a set of policy
choices. Each attribute can take on 2K+1 different values, depending on the value of the
attribute itself (either 1 or 0) and the value of K other attributes with which it interacts.
The implications of a rugged landscape (Figure 2) are very much a function of the
search behavior of actors moving on the landscape. If actors were omniscient and could
readily search globally, then the behavior on a smooth surface (K=0) or a rugged surface
would not fundamentally differ. In both instances, actors would identify the global peak.
However, a more realistic analysis developed within the behavioral tradition of intelligent
local search (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963) assumes that actors are
intelligent but their intelligence is local to their position on the landscape. Thus, actors are
assumed to be able to identify the positive and negative gradients around their current
position, but not capable of making similar judgements for more distant ones1. 
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1 Levinthal (1997) observes that the implicit assumption of most empirical analyses is that K is always equal to
zero. In other words, organizations have an additive fitness structure in which the fitness contribution of each
element of the organization is assumed to be independent of other attributes of the organization.Figure 2. A “rugged” or multipeak fitness landscape
However, in a rugged landscape, such incremental search procedure will lead only to
the local peak closest to the starting point of the search process, regardless of its height
relative to other peaks in the landscape. As a result of this locking in to the first available
solution, a strong form of path dependence is observed and, on average, modest performance
(“competency traps”). One mechanism to overcome such “traps” is to engage in “long-
jumps”, random explorations of more distant portions of the landscape. Long jumps involve
the simultaneous alteration of many elements of N. Long jumps emphasize sample variation,
preventing the company from falling into competency traps, and are more valuable in
turbulent environments in which the value of current knowledge diminishes, making
exploitation less relevant. However, such distant efforts, by not exploiting wisdom gained by
past experience, are likely to result in a deterioration of performance. So, the problem of
adaptation strategies in rugged landscapes can be reframed as a familiar dilemma: how to get
the benefits of exploration without losing the advantages of exploiting acquired knowledge
(March, 1991). At least a partial solution to this dilemma lies in search strategies that
recombine elements of existing solutions, as Galunic and Eisenhardt’s (2001) idea of
patching may suggest, i.e., to combine building blocks from distant regions of the landscape.
A recombination strategy allows whole blocks of existing solutions to be changed rather than
modifying them piecemeal. A recombination is a shift in position that exploits knowledge
without being trapped by this knowledge. 
4.- A framework for corporate strategy2
Based on our previous discussion, next we introduce a dynamic framework of
corporate strategy based on three interlinked sets of processes (Figure 3). Although the
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2 The development of this framework was grounded with the help of a longitudinal case study focused on
the corporate strategy of Lujan, a car component manufacturing company, from 1986 through 2001. This
case is discussed in detail in the dissertation “Creating Corporate Advantage in Turbulent Environments”
(Caldart, 2003).processes mutually reinforce each other, for descriptive purposes we will describe them
sequentially. 
Figure 3. The Corporate Strategy Triangle
We  conceive the corporate strategy of the firm as the decisions made by the
corporate level with the purpose of driving, pacing and framing the firm’s overall evolution
process.
First, Corporate Management develops a representation of the interfirm fitness
landscape (to drive evolution). Then, according to that representation, organizations position
themselves climbing a basin of attraction towards a peak, using different kinds of evolution
strategies, such as incremental search, long jumps or recombination (to pace evolution).
Finally, the architecture of the firm is designed by manipulating the context of self-organizing
through the management of interdependences (to frame evolution).
4.1.- Developing a cognitive representation of the fitness landscape
Cognition is a forward-looking form of intelligence that is premised on an actor’s
belief about the linkage between the choice of actions and the subsequent impact of those
actions on outcomes. Such beliefs derive from the actor’s mental model of the world or
“dominant logics” (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). In contrast, experiential wisdom accumulates
as a result of positive and negative reinforcement of prior choices (Levitt and March, 1988).
Because managers are rationally bounded (Simon, 1997; March and Simon, 1958,
Cyert and March, 1963), cognitive representations are grounded on the actual landscape, but
constitute simplified caricatures of the decision context that show lower dimensionality than
the actual landscape. Levitt and March (1988) mention, as usual limitations of cognition, the
human tendency to overestimate the probability of events that actually occur and of events
that are available to attention because of their recency or saliency, insensitivity to sample
size, the tendency to overattribute events to the intentional actions of individuals, the use of
simple linear and functional rules, the association of causality with spatial and temporal
contiguity and the assumption that big effects must have big causes. For instance, Pascale’s
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Strategy  (1984) case description of Honda’s penetration of the U.S. motorcycle market, in contrast
with a Boston Consulting Group (BCG) report, offers an enlightening story that reveals a
widespread tendency to overlook the process through which organizations experiment, adapt
and learn. We tend to impute coherence and purposive rationality to events when the opposite
may be closer to the truth.
This assumption is consistent with the normative traditions of the management
literature that offer low-dimensional typologies such as the Boston Consulting Group or GE
matrixes (Hax and Majluf, 1984) and generic strategies (Porter, 1980; Treacy and Wieserma,
1995, Hax and Wilde, 2001) to help structure the choice of firm strategy. These analytical
representations of the fitness landscape that reduce the dimensionality and, in turn, the
cognitive complexity of the space provide a strong guide to action. However, to the extent
that the representation does not capture the essential structure of the real fitness landscape, it
will be a mistaken guide (Levinthal and Warglien, 1999).
In our model of corporate strategy under the NK framework, representation of the
interfirm fitness landscape is the corporate level’s representation of the nature and prospects
of alternative corporate configurations that the corporation may adopt in the fitness
landscape. The set of possible corporate configurations is defined by the different
combinations of firm’s attributes (N) and nature and intensity of the interrelationships
between them (K). 
Therefore, driving refers to developing a cognitive representation of the business
landscape that is used by the corporate office as a basis for the definition of the corporate
value creation model that specifies the role of businesses in such corporate framework. This
corporate value creation model is complemented by the other dimensions in the triangle.
Shifting cognition. Cognitive representations provide not only a powerful suggestion
for an initial choice of organizational form, but also a useful discipline on subsequent efforts
at experiential search. However, with a fixed cognition, the organization immediately
identifies the global peak with respect to its cognitive representation. In turbulent
environments the need to shift the initial cognition becomes more crucial for two reasons.
First, because rapid changes in the environment require the organization to adapt and change
more frequently, and second, because in an uncertain business landscape, the quality of the
cognitive representations will tend to be lower. 
Changing cognitive representations can be an important form of adaptation in two
different respects. First, the new representation may consist of a better mental model of the
actor’s environment, reflecting weaknesses of the prior representation or environmental shifts
that render a previously adequate representation less effective. Second, shifting cognitive
frameworks effectively results in a sequential allocation of attention to different facets of the
firm’s environment. The set of performance metrics and an organization’s structure
importantly influence actors’ perceptions of their problem space. Only by offering a fresh
perspective with a shift in performance metrics is further improvement possible. 
The shift in policies prompted by the new representation may result in the loss of the
experiential wisdom accumulated in the context of the prior representation. However, with
dramatic changes in the fitness landscape, prior experiential wisdom is rendered largely
obsolete. In the face of dramatic environmental change, the ability to rapidly indentify
attractive regions in the landscape, via a cognitive process resulting from a shift in cognitive
representation, can compensate for the loss associated with forgone experiential wisdom. 
74.2.- Landscape search strategy
Cognitive representations have been shown to be a critical determinant of
managerial choice and action (Fiol and Huff, 1992; Walsh, 1995). A firm’s choice of strategy
is often a by-product of managers’ representation of their problem space. 
Guided by its cognitive representation and its experiential learning, the corporation
tries to “climb” a basin of attraction towards a peak. According to the way the company
balances the trade-off between exploration and exploitation activities, hill climbing strategies
can take several forms. As illustration, below we discuss the local or incremental search, the
non-incremental search or “long-jumps”, and the recombination of building blocks. 
Local or incremental search. Search is local when the company aims at innovating
within its current corporate model. In terms of Kauffman’s model, local search takes place
when the set of business attributes are varied only incrementally. Then the company engages
in local “hill-climbing” or neighborhood search (March and Simon, 1958) towards a peak,
where the height of the hill reflects the fitness value of the associated organizational form. In
other words, the company aims at improving its position through experiential learning within
its current cognitive representation. 
This strategy allows high explotation, as most elements of N remain unchanged, but
limited exploration, as learning is constrained by the local topography on which the actor lies,
increasing the risks of suffering the pathology labeled by Levitt and March (1988) as
“competency trap”, or climbing towards a local peak that is unattractive. Local search is
advisable when local peaks are attractive (Levinthal and Warglien, 1999) and low turbulence
permits to keep the value of current experience. 
Local search is equivalent to the static efficiency concept developed in Ghemawat
and Ricart (1993) and therefore represents one extreme in a continuum of choices. The other
extreme, dynamic efficiency, corresponds to the non-incremental search presented next.
Non-incremental search or “long-jumps”. In contrast to local search, long jumps
involve the adoption of a new corporate business model or simultaneous alteration of many
elements of N. The literature distinguishes two bases for radical changes: failure-induced
search and innovative activity (Levinthal, 1997). This strategy is characterized by high
exploration but limited exploitation and emphasizes sample variation in the search for
dynamic efficiency. Long-jumps permit to prevent the company from falling into competency
traps, and are more valuable in turbulent environments in which the value of current
knowledge diminishes, making exploitation less relevant. However, the impact of alternative
sampling strategies varies dramatically depending on whether the evaluation mechanism is
one of on-line experimentation or off-line cognition (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000). If the
evaluation of alternatives is off-line, the variation in the sample is generally an attractive
property. If low outcome draws can be costlessly discarded (or at low cost), the greater
variance in the sample, holding the mean constant, increases the expected value of the draws
that are adopted, therefore encouraging long jumps. Real options (Amram and Kulatilaka,
1999), cooperation strategies for risk sharing such as strategic alliances, and hedging
strategies such as venture capital investments are examples of how firms aim at absorbing
complexity through low-cost, multiple and sometimes conflicting representations of
environmental variety. In a process of “on-line” experimentation, however, such variation
may prove fatal because the actor experiences the consequences of each experimental draw. 
Off-line experimentation is one form of locating the search strategy in between the
two extremes. As elaborated in Ghemawat and Ricart (1993), there is a tendency to move
8towards the extremes, making the intermediate cases difficult to reach. Off-line
experimentation is one alternative; recombination as explained next is another, as it could be
possible to think of temporal arrangements that periodically move from one extreme to the
other. All these solutions and others that may be developed will create important
organizational tensions (Ghemawat and Ricart, 1993).
Recombinations.  At least a partial solution to the dilemma of how to get the
advantages of exploration without losing the benefits of exploitation through “on line”
experimentation is the recombination of elements of existing partial solutions (Levinthal and
Warglien, 1999) by manipulating the interdependencies (K) between different elements of N.
Entrepreneurs do not randomly sample the space of alternatives, but find new, unforeseen
combinations of known but previously distant elements. Galunic and Eisenhardt (2001)
propose “chartering”, a competitive process between units that enables the recombination or
“patching” (Eisenhardt & Brown, 1999) of product-market domains between business units
in response to market changes. Patching allows to engage in long jumps and exploit existing
building blocks of knowledge without being trapped by this knowledge. In this way, the
company obtains intertemporal economies of scope (Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2001), arising
from the replacement of old businesses that used a particular resource by a new business that
does so, in response to changing market conditions.
If driving represented the corporate view of the landscape, pacing is the definition of
the key search strategy to transform the corporate value creation model into action. Together
they identify the way the corporate level adds value to the business portfolio. The architectural
design closes the model by defining the key organizational elements to implement such value
creation model.
4.3.- Architectural design of the firm
Several authors have warned about the paradox that organizations have to face
between the need to innovate and the need to be stable and ordered (Miller, 1990; Pascale;
1990; Stacey; 1993; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998). Going too far in the search for innovation
and creativity results in a rule-breaking culture, loose structures and processes that obscure
responsibilities, and excessive but ineffective communication, leading to the “chaos trap”
(Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998) or “error catastrophe” (Kauffman, 1993). Conversely, going
too far in the search for tight structures, schedules and processes results in a loss of
flexibility, poor innovation and a predictable strategy, leading to the “bureaucratic trap”
(Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998) or a “complexity catastrophe” (Kauffman, 1993). The paradox
between innovation and order is addressed in Kauffman’s model by the value of the variable
K. Designs with low interdependence (low K) and, as a result, with clear attractors, i.e. stable
performance metrics, keep the level of interactions low. In this context, change through the
alteration of one or a few components of N is effective, as it has low suppressing3 effects
across other components. However, flexibility comes at the expense of poor diversity.
In contrast, with higher levels of K, high levels of interactions promote
intraorganizational learning as diversity of behavior rises with interdependencies, but lowers
the effectiveness of organization level change. Tightly coupled systems (high K) have great
difficulty in adapting even to modest change. They cannot engage in exploration without
forgoing the benefits of exploitation (Levinthal, 1997). 
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3 An initiative is said to suffer suppressing effects when there is a reaction to that initiative that prevents it
from producing the desired effects. Through its architectural design the firm broadly matches the variety of the
environment it has to face. Therefore, the more turbulent the environment becomes, the more
interdependent will be the architectural design, as the firm tries to increase internal
knowledge and activity sharing. This assumption is consistent with Ashby’s law of requisite
variety4 and Lawrence and Lorsch’s (1967) Integration and Differentiation framework. In
other words, in turbulent environments the organization cannot allow divisions –especially
those that are related because they have common customers or technologies– the “luxury” of
running totally autonomously, as very valuable knowledge and cost-sharing opportunities
would be sacrificed, leading to an “error catastrophe”.
Emergent “self-organized” interunit cooperation initiatives are, by definition, “ad-
hoc” and loosely coupled. Conversely, centrally imposed interdivisional collaboration
initiatives tend to be formally structured, generating tight couplings affecting all the
divisions, regardless of their real needs. Eisenhardt and Brown (1998) point out the important
role of self-organizing as a process that solves this paradox, placing the company “at the edge
of chaos”, through activities loosely constructed but possessing critical structure points, a
culture of frequent change in a context of strict rules and channels for real-time fact-based
communication within and across groups. Cross-unit communication appears to work better
when initiatives emerge from the interested units themselves than when they are imposed by
the corporate center. The superiority of self-organizing processes as opposed to tight control
as a way to release the creative forces of the organization and its sensitivity to design
influences leaves the corporate center with the role of designing “simple rules” (Eisenhardt
and Sull, 2001), i.e. objectives or policies, that frame self-organizing. Corporate executives
are the best candidates to perform this role, as they are more likely than others to have a
broad architectural knowledge of the firm (Galunic & Eisenhardt, 2001). Similarly, Stacey
(1993) proposes that corporate management create the context in which collaboration can
happen by bringing managers together to talk and perhaps find collaborative opportunities. In
their recent multiple case study, Chakravarthy, Zaheer and Zaheer (2001) also suggest that the
transfer of knowledge related to the company’s core competencies appears to be more
effective when business units relate to each other without direct corporate intervention.
Finally, Goold and Campbell (2002) propose that multibusiness companies be seen as
“structured networks” in which corporate intervention is only desirable as a means to remedy
the “difficult links” or coordination problems that the network cannot solve effectively
through self-organizing. We can interpret self-organization in an organization as the process
of political interaction and group learning from which innovation and new strategic directions
for the organization may emerge. (Stacey, 1993). 
Chakravarthy et al. (2001) view as factors that increase the opportunities to share
knowledge the following: the existence of strategic interdependencies (eg., common
customers), a structure promoting interdependence, systems and processes that disseminate
information across units (eg, a firm-wide intranet), routine strategic planning meetings, the
depth (across multiple levels) and breadth (across multiple functions) of ties, the participation
of one business unit in the strategic review of another, high mobility across divisions and
opportunities to meet informally. 
However, recent literature on knowledge sharing suggests that the best initiatives for
synergy development appear to be those that come from individual divisions’ willingness to
cooperate and not those that are identified and developed company-wide directly by the
corporate level, as this behavior may increase the development of a higher-than-necessary
10
4 “The real key to regulation is to be able to match the variety of exogenous disturbances to the system” (Scott,
1992 on Ashby’s law).level of interdependencies. These interdependencies may result in important suppressing
effects, leading the company towards a “complexity catastrophe” (a very high K) that makes
it incapable of dealing with rapid and unpredictable change. Therefore, the solution requires
that the corporate level be indirectly involved in promoting collaboration opportunities by
developing an architectural design that encourages business units to self-organize, identify
such opportunities and implement the ones that they judge most valuable. 
As seen, the organizational architecture fits the cognition and search strategy to
implement the underlying corporate value creation model. In this architecture it is key
to define the level of organizational design vs. self-organization that frames corporate
strategy.
4.4.- Conclusions
The motivation of this paper was to shed some light on the long-lasting but stalled
debate on corporate strategy. For this purpose, we opted to approach the field innovatively.
We grounded on the theoretical guidance provided by complexity theory and, particularly, on
Kauffman’s NK model. This theoretical approach offers very promising avenues for
improving our formal understanding of social processes, characterized by non-linearity,
positive feedback and sense-making, features not captured by the tradition of database studies
developed in our field.
The insights provided by the Corporate Strategy Triangle permit us to affirm that
undoubtedly corporate strategy matters. The Triangle enabled us to visualize how corporate
performance is a result of the complex interplay between the cognitive representation of the
firm’s payoff surface, materialized in the Strategic Plan, the kind of evolutionary moves or
corporate strategic initiatives performed by the corporation and the architectural design
chosen in order to address environmental variety. 
The research findings obtained in this dissertation led us to conceive corporate
strategy as the decision level that “drives”, “paces” and “frames” corporate-wide evolution
through the choice, at the corporate level of the firm, of a particular equilibrium
configuration of cognition-evolution pattern-architectural design. 
Evolution is driven by choosing a cognitive representation that leads the
organization towards a particular area of the fitness landscape. 
Pacing is achieved by shifting between gradual local search strategies, characterized
by strong exploitation, and long jumps that make the company explore a different area of the
landscape or, in other words, develop a different business model.
Framing concerns the development of broad organizational arrangements that ease
the emergence of fruitful, self-organized, loosely coupled processes as sources of corporate
advantage.
The equilibrium configuration of the driving-pacing-framing chosen by the
corporate level may lead to high or poor performance, but, undoubtedly, has a substantial
impact on this variable. 
These ideas can help also to reinterpret the mainstream literature in the field in
different ways. First, conceiving corporate strategy as the choice of an equilibrium
11configuration of cognition-corporate initiatives-architectural design highlights the fact that
corporate strategy is not just a matter concerning diversified firms, as many definitions of the
field implicitly or explicitly assume, but a decision level that exists in every firm, and
previous to any business strategy. 
Second, we can also reinterpret the well known notion of “parenting advantage”
(Goold & Campbell, 1994). This advantage can be understood as the extent to which a
particular business fits with the configuration of cognition-evolution pattern-architectural
design of the corporation. For instance, a company having a portfolio of businesses
competing in highly stable industries probably will benefit from a strictly disciplined
application of the strategic plan, based on a smart cognitive representation of the rather
predictable kind of payoff surface that these businesses face. For this group, a business
competing in a highly turbulent environment may not be a good choice for a diversification
decision, as the corporate logic of strict discipline, combined with a poorer cognitive
representation as a result of the dynamism of this business’s environment, and the consequent
need for a more complex architectural design, would provoke a strategic mismatch leading to
poor performance. Thus, businesses that are related in terms of Compustat SIC-codes may
not be good diversification choices if they do not fit the corporate equilibrium configuration
of the triangle. Contrarily, apparently unrelated businesses may be smart choices for
diversification if they match the corporation’s particular configuration of the corporate
strategy triangle. 
The framework developed in this paper formalizes a dynamic view of corporate
strategy. The corporate role is divided into three interrelated actions. Driving defines the
cognitive representation of reality. Pacing sets the search strategy experimentation. Framing
defines the necessary architectural design. Seen together and evolving in time, they define the
corporate role as that of dynamically crafting businesses by driving, pacing and framing the
corporate value creation model. Corporate office is constantly shifting among these three
roles to increase the value of its business portfolio.
Furthermore, this framework can be used as the theoretical cornerstone for the
development of empirical research. Agent-based simulations based on Kauffman’s NK model
might permit to capture and generalize the Triangle’s key properties. Describing the evolution
and relative performance of different configurations of the corporate strategy triangle would
permit to reach more general conclusions on how this interplay of cognition-search strategy-
architectural design works5. 
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